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THE 1969 TAX REFORM ACT AND CHARITIES:
FIFTY YEARS LATER
Philip Hackney*
Fifty years ago, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to
regulate charitable activity of the rich.1 Congress constricted the influence of
the wealthy on private foundations and hindered the abuse of dollars put into
charitable solution through income tax rules. Concerned that the likes of the
Mellons, the Rockefellers, and the Fords were putting substantial wealth into
foundations for huge tax breaks while continuing to control those funds for
their own private ends, Congress revamped the tax rules to force charitable
foundations created and controlled by the wealthy to pay out charitable
dollars annually and avoid self-dealing. Today, with concerns of similar
misuse of philanthropic institutions to further wealthy interests,2 it is
worthwhile to reconsider this significant legislation fifty years later.
Natural questions arise. What was the goal of Congress with respect to
charity and with respect to tax? Did it accomplish these goals? Are those
goals still relevant? What goals might suggest themselves today? Do we have
the ability to modify the law to support those new goals? On November 1,
2019, the Pittsburgh Tax Review hosted a symposium to examine the 1969
Tax Act.
Pittsburgh was a fit and proper place to ask these questions. Andrew
Carnegie founded Carnegie Steel along the three rivers of Pittsburgh and

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I thank Tony Infanti and
Jim Fishman for comments on drafts of this Introduction. A big thanks to both our symposium participants
Ellen Aprill, Dana Brakman Reiser, Jim Fishman, Ray Madoff, and Khrista McCarden, and our
commentators Carolyn Duronio, Penina Lieber, and Elaine Waterhouse Wilson. Thank you to our student
editors Ashley Rundell and Greg McIntosh, as well as all the other students that took part in putting
together a successful live symposium in November 2019. I also thank the University of Pittsburgh School
of Law for the significant resources it made available to make this symposium possible.
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Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).

2

See ROB REICH, JUST GIVING (2018); ANAND GIRIDHARADAS, WINNERS TAKE ALL (2018).
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penned what Benjamin Soskis refers to as the urtext of modern philanthropy,3
The Gospel of Wealth, in 1889.4 There Carnegie said the “gospel of wealth”
called “upon the millionaire to sell all that he hath and give it in the highest
and best form to the poor, by administering his estate himself for the good of
his fellows, before he is called upon to lie down and rest upon the bosom of
Mother Earth.”5 The 1969 Tax Act did not deny the “millionaire” their right
to do as Carnegie directs and gain tax benefits. But Congress structured the
Act with distrust that the millionaire would take such actions out of the
goodness of their heart. This distrust was aimed to stop the millionaire from
taking advantage of the tax benefits derived from charitable organizations. It
had the practical effect though of regulating the millionaire engaging in
charity in this private foundation form.
Pittsburgh is also the city of Frick, Mellon, Heinz, and Westinghouse.
This city once of steel, coal, banking, ketchup, and electrical generation is
now a city of higher education, high tech, and cutting-edge health care all
backed in part by the philanthropy generated from these past acts. It thus
presents an ideal environment to explore the issue of philanthropy carried out
by the wealthy in the past and continuing today. Its five biggest private
foundations by assets in 2017 include the Richard King Mellon Foundation
at $2.5 billion, Heinz Endowments at $1.6 billion, Sarah Scaife Foundation
at $827 million, Dietrich Foundation at $795 million, and Hillman Family
Foundation at $791 million.6
Though we could not possibly address all matters within the 1969 Tax
Act within the five Articles that are part of this symposium, I think these five
Articles raise some of the most important, current, and challenging issues

3
Benjamin Soskis, Both More and No More: The Historical Split Between Charity and
Philanthropy, October 15, 2014, Hudson.org. https://www.hudson.org/research/10723-both-more-andno-more-the-historical-split-between-charity-and-philanthropy.
4
ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 37 (Carnegie Corporation 2017),
https://www.carnegie.org/media/filer_public/0a/e1/0ae166c5-fca3-4adf-82a7-74c0534cd8de/gospel_
of_wealth_2017.pdf.
5

Id.

6

Joyce Gannon, Pittsburgh's Top Foundations by Grant Money: Hillman Rises in the Ranks, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (May 30, 2018), https://www.post-gazette.com/business/pittsburgh-company-news/
2018/05/30/top-foundations-pittsburgh-Henry-Hillman-family-foundations-grants-heinzendowments/stories/201805300120.
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presented by the 1969 Tax Act and what it means for wealth and philanthropy
today.
The 1969 Tax Act adopted rules to separate charities for income tax
purposes into either public charities or private foundations.7 Public charities
on the one hand are generally made up of institutions like churches, hospitals,
and schools, and by those institutions that build a broad public base by
seeking donations from a large percentage of the public.8 Private foundations
on the other hand are those charities primarily supported through donations
by one person or one family.9 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Ford Foundation
are all private foundations started up by one wealthy family without a public
constituency to exercise power over the decisions of the charity. Congress
distrusted private foundations because control lay with a creator or family
and not a broad public. It saw them as undemocratic institutions.
After a major Treasury study10 and significant hearings discussed in
Professor James Fishman’s Article, Congress enacted rules to ensure private
foundations would work to further charitable purposes. Those rules included
a prohibition on self-dealing between the foundation and its primary
donors,11 a requirement that the organization annually pay out to charitable
purposes 5% of assets,12 a prohibition on holding a significant interest in a
private company,13 a limitation on investments that might jeopardize the

7
I.R.C. § 509. This distinction had existed prior to this time, but not in as stark a way. See Ellen P.
Aprill, The Private Foundation Excise Tax on Self-Dealing: Contours, Comparisons, and Character, 17
PITT. TAX REV. 297, 301 (2020).
8

I.R.C. §§ 170(b), 509.

9

Id. § 509.

10

S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS 5 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
11

I.R.C. § 4941.

12

Id. § 4942.

13

Id. § 4943.
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endowment of the foundation,14 and taxes applied to noncharitable
expenditures.15
Professor Fishman’s Article, The Private Foundation Rules at Fifty:
How Did We Get Them and Do They Meet Current Needs?, starts this
symposium by navigating the history leading up to the 1969 Tax Act.16 His
Article leaves me at once optimistic and depressed. It leaves me optimistic
because of the substantial research that went into developing the 1969 Tax
Act suggesting Congress can and has engaged in real deliberative acts that
might be models for those who advocate for deliberative democracy. It leaves
me depressed because it demonstrates that congressmen engaged in much
demagoguery to pass the Act. Fishman, nevertheless, concludes that the 1969
Tax Act mostly worked, at least with respect to large foundations. By work,
Professor Fishman means these organizations largely have legitimacy within
society today because of the rule-based system ensuring that they work
towards the public interest. Still, he thinks these rules are not working
properly as to smaller foundations and perchance we need new rules for them
ensuring that the public interest is furthered.
Professor Fishman provides a tremendous service here by telescoping
this historical view further into the past than just the immediate acts that led
to the 1969 Tax Act. He gives a richness to the development of this
legislation. In its own way, his Article is a picture of why sometimes law can
get made and how it ends up being made. It suggests lawmaking is often
constructed on a mythologized factual foundation, but that mythology is
critical to the passing of legislation.
In The Private Foundation Excise Tax on Self-Dealing: Contours,
Comparisons, and Character, Professor Ellen P. Aprill looks at the 1969 Tax
Act provision prohibiting self-dealing.17 Though the paper’s focus may seem
narrow, it is anything but. She uses this fiftieth anniversary to consider the
excise tax limitation on self-interested transactions in light of U.S. Supreme

14

Id. § 4944.

15

Id. § 4945.

16

James Fishman, The Private Foundation Rules at Fifty: How Did We Get Them and Do They
Meet Current Needs?, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 247 (2020).
17

Aprill, supra note 7.
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Court precedent in National Federation of Independent Businesses v.
Sebelius18 on the nature of a tax versus a penalty within constitutional
jurisprudence. She also looks at whether the tax is intended to be a Pigouvian
tax.
These two lenses lead to some interesting insights. First, there could be
some constitutional infirmity with this regime if the NFIB precedent were to
apply to treat this “tax” as a penalty. Professor Aprill cautions though that
the self-dealing tax passed constitutional muster in the past and the potential
constitutional infirmity is far from clear under the NFIB precedent. Second,
Professor Aprill considers whether the excise tax is intended to be a
Pigouvian tax in order to correct some market failure and if that is the case
whether the IRS has the capacity to use this Pigouvian tool well. She
concludes that the design of the tax and the capability of the IRS are unsuited
to correcting the market failure involved. To Professor Aprill, it may be
impossible for the IRS to serve as a regulator of the charitable sector. The
IRS simply does not have the knowledge necessary nor the latitude to set
these penalties to accord with the harm associated with self-dealing acts. It
leads her to back a growing position within the charitable world—we should
consider replacing the IRS with some other agency in its charitable regulatory
duty.19
Professor Aprill’s analysis is powerful. If indeed the IRS’s primary tools
are nothing but Pigouvian taxes to regulate charitable activity, it is likely a
poor regulator of the sector because of the inability to calculate the harm
involved. Because I do not think the primary harm of private foundation selfdealing lies in the use of a nonprofit for selfish reasons, but in the misuse of
federal tax benefits, I think that the tax code likely still needs these
protections as long as we are to maintain significant tax benefits for
charitable contributions. It makes sense to broadly stop self-dealing
transactions because it makes it possible to use a simple rule rather than a
complex standard to regulate private foundations.20 Of course, Professor

18

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

19

Aprill, supra note 7, at 336.

20

See Philip Hackney, Charitable Organization Oversight: Rules v. Standards, 13 PITT. TAX REV.
83 (2015) (arguing the IRS ought to publish more simple rules for the charitable world to enable the best
amount of oversight of that sector).
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Aprill raises the fair counter that it is possible this highly strict regime is less
than optimal in obtaining compliance.
Professor Ray Madoff in The Five Percent Fig Leaf focuses implicitly
upon a conundrum of the charitable world and one Congress seems to have
considered as it contemplated enacting the 1969 Tax Act.21 Can you meet a
charitable purpose by managing investments and paying out some portion of
those investments to charity? If you can, what is the amount of money you
must pay out? Must the entirety be spent over a certain defined period of
time? One part of this conundrum, that an organization can demonstrate its
charitable nature by managing investment funds and granting dollars to
charitable causes, has always given me pause because of the mixed purposes
involved. Is the primary purpose to manage funds, to hold funds for future
charitable activity, or to grant funds to actual charitable purposes? The 1969
Tax Act made clear that such a combined activity indeed met the charitable
purpose test found in § 501(c)(3).
While Professor Madoff, like Professor Fishman, believes that the 5%
payout has been successful in legitimizing private foundations in the larger
culture of the United States, she argues we have been conned into this belief
by what she refers to as the “five percent fig-leaf.” The payout is a fig-leaf
because a significant portion of the 5% payout can so easily be utilized for
selfish purposes.
Professor Madoff does not take an explicit stand on whether 5% is the
right amount to justify the tax exemption of private foundations. However,
she in effect argues that such an amount is at least a minimum. Though it is
a minimum, at least three rules undermine the sufficiency of that charitable
payout. First, administrative expenses count toward the payout. This allows
a donor’s family to be well compensated. Secondly, program-related
investments (PRIs) are counted toward the payout. PRIs are investments that
are considered charitable in nature.22 In a PRI, a private foundation makes a
“charitable” investment that in theory no investor would make, in order to
hopefully correct some ill of society. These are thought to further a charitable
purpose. Professor Madoff argues that while this category of “charitable”
investment was once narrow, its bounds have expanded to include many
traditional investments. This expansion erodes the duty to contribute to real

21

See Ray D. Madoff, The Five Percent Fig Leaf, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 341 (2020).

22

I.R.C. § 4944(c).
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charitable purposes. Finally, private foundations can meet their payout with
a payment to a donor-advised fund. A donor-advised fund (DAF) is an
account maintained at a public charity referred to as a sponsoring
organization. The sponsoring organization generally invests DAF funds until
the donor of a particular fund advises the sponsoring organization as to which
charity it ought to make grants.
It seems hard to argue with the claim that payouts to DAFs should not
count. Congress in the 1969 Tax Act directed private foundations to make a
payout to charity annually, and DAFs are no more than middlemen. If I am
given pause by the ability of private foundations to invest funds and pay
grants for charitable purposes, I simply cannot at all accept the legitimacy of
investing funds to pay “charitable” grants to another fund to pay “charitable”
grants. Similarly, the allowance of big salaries and cushy trips for donor
children to count as payout appears problematic on its face. The richest
discussion at the symposium ensued regarding PRIs. That conversation
returns us to Carnegie’s urtext encouraging philanthropic investment over
direct payment to those in charitable need. While we did not solve that
conundrum, if you read Professor Madoff’s and Professor Brakman’s
Articles together, I think you will have a much stronger sense of the debate.
Reading Professor Madoff’s Article suggests to me that we need a better
dataset of how private foundations are used. Work is being done, such as that
by Professor Brian Galle.23 Nevertheless, it is odd that we can have so much
information from reporting to the IRS on Form 990-PF, the tax information
return of a private foundation, and still feel poor in good data to make
decisions about the efficacy of the laws and regulations applicable to private
foundations.24 Perhaps there are two problems: (1) the data collected is not
all of the right data, and (2) the data is misleading because of a failure to
require private foundations to report in a uniform manner. We could use more
scholarship examining how to generate better data in this realm through a
more thoughtfully designed Form 990-PF.

23
See, e.g. Brian D. Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow the Law? Evidence from Adoption of the
Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 36 J. OF POL ANALYSIS & MGT. (2016) (using
IRS data on private foundations to determine whether private foundations were complying with
UPMIFA).
24

I.R.S. Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation.
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In her Article, Foundation Regulation in Our Age of Impact, Professor
Dana Brakman Reiser inspects the idea that investments by charity today
must have “impact.”25 By this, people mean that a private foundation
investment ought to align with its mission. The philanthropic community has
recently taken great interest in searching for such investments of impact.26
While philanthropic institutions might seem to be a natural place to pursue
such a portfolio, Professor Brakman Reiser notes private foundations have
been hesitant to pursue these strategies. They apparently fear violating the
rule prohibiting private foundations from making jeopardizing investments.
Professor Brakman Reiser provides helpful pragmatic suggestions on how
we might modify the rules to make such activity possible.
Professor Brakman Reiser’s Article highlights that the 1969 Tax Act
was enacted at a certain place in time with a very particular understanding of
investment and charitable acts. Those notions look dated now. That lack of
connection to today’s circumstances augurs for a remodel of our legal
structure regulating the space of philanthropy. Maybe it even needs a
complete restructuring. Professor Brakman Reiser focuses first on impact
through what are known as mission-related investments (MRIs). In MRIs,
foundations invest with goals other than total return in mind, such as
environmental, social, and governance factors, but the investment is not
considered charitable for tax purposes.
If this current of mistrust regarding investing to further a charitable
purpose is latent in MRIs, it is at the forefront of discussions regarding PRIs.
However, Professor Brakman Reiser advances this discussion by proposing
some potential solutions to this impasse. Her Article, and her work generally,
highlights the way the world may simply move past the charitable regulatory
architecture created in the 1969 Tax Act if it is not modified to conform to
the demands of today’s social justice-minded donor. If we want that
architecture to have continuing importance, some changes are almost surely
needed to permit greater flexibility to foundation boards.
Professor Brakman Reiser’s Article operates as a counterpoint to
Professor Madoff’s Article. Professor Brakman Reiser sees investing dollars

25

Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Regulation in Our Age of Impact, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 357 (2020).

26

In 2017, the Ford Foundation announced that it would invest a large portion of its endowment to
“earn not only attractive financial returns but concrete social returns as well.” James B. Stewart, Ford
Foundation is an Unlikely Convert to ‘Impact’ Investing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/business/ford-foundation-mission-investment.html.
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with charity in mind to be an important part of a charitable institution. While
it is not fair to say Professor Madoff is against thoughtful foundation
investment, I think it fair to say that Professor Madoff is skeptical about the
idea that the expanded world of private foundation PRI charitable
investments are all genuinely charitable. Charities show their charitability
primarily by their acts through grants, not through investments. The
“charitable investing” idea is seen in the Carnegie urtext and imbued by the
old adage “give a man a fish, and he will eat for a day; teach the man to fish,
and he will eat for a lifetime.” The skepticism to this investing approach
perhaps grows with experience over years watching U.S. inequality increase
year after year, all while we are told that the investors will be the solution to
social problems spurred on by that same inequality.
Professor Khrista McCarden writes on private operating foundations
that establish and maintain art museums, such as the J. Paul Getty
Foundation.27 She is concerned that these foundations are highly private in
nature. Written before the start of the racial justice revolution spurred on by
the killing of Mr. George Floyd, her Article presciently investigates whether
a charitable purpose can be furthered in a private way, and whether charitable
organizations should be regulated to provide more to systematically
disempowered communities. This is an interesting area to review and it
highlights some of the challenges of dealing with defining a charitable
purpose in the first place.
As Professor Fishman demonstrated, many of the senators considering
the 1969 Tax Act highlighted to good political effect how wealthy individuals
like the Mellons utilized charitable dollars to further abstruse interests like
art and scholarly endeavors.28 As someone who is deeply engaged and
invested in the art world, I particularly appreciate the importance of the
preservation of art. I believe the preservation of art and antiquities is
important to our humanity in and of itself and is worth doing. However, I
believe it critical that that preservation come with broad public access, and
Professor McCarden’s Article speaks very clearly to this point. Crucially, her
position is that art museums must not just be open to the public but should

27
Khrista McCarden, Private Operating Foundation Reform and J. Paul Getty, 17 PITT. TAX REV.
387 (2020).
28

Fishman, supra note 16, at 262.
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demonstrate the ways in which their reach extends to disempowered
communities.
One technical challenge to Professor McCarden’s Article is the very
nature of the 1969 Tax Act. It legitimized “private” foundations. In that vein,
I think the presumption that private art museums fail as a tax exemption
matter because they are private and not public misses a part of the 1969 Tax
Act. A “private” foundation is very much the opposite within charity of a
public charity. While I agree that private nature is deeply problematic from a
normative standpoint, Congress sanctioned private charity, private control,
and private investment. To be fair, private foundations are by law required to
meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3) by primarily furthering charitable
purposes that must be public in nature.29 The problem is that the wealthy
contributor is the primary arbiter of that purpose and there is little chance the
IRS will challenge that purpose privately determined. Still, this criticism does
not take any power away from Professor McCarden’s Article as it
interrogates that private nature of this type of philanthropy.
Professor McCarden also suggests that these private operating
foundations might be uniquely likely to be infected with bad acts (actors).
My guess is that these concerns run across private foundations, but perhaps
there is greater potential for operating foundations like the Getty Trust
discussed in her Article that focus on collecting expensive art to engage in
more private acts benefitting their founders. I laud her call to open access to
these institutions to not just the “public” but to systemically disempowered
populations.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
I am excited to share this set of Articles with you. They confirm that the
1969 Tax Act responded to real concern and real need, but that the
architecture needs some reconsideration today, fifty years later. These
Articles help move that conversation forward about what a new private
foundation architecture might look like, or if perhaps that architecture simply
cannot do the task that it has been asked to accomplish.

29
Rev. Rul. 74-600, 1974-2 C.B. 385 (the placing of three paintings on the premises of the founder
of the private foundation considered an act of self-dealing taxable under § 4941 of the Code); IRS Tech.
Adv. Mem. 88-24-001 (June 17, 1988) (finding displays of artwork in the founder’s home with little
access to the public both an act of self-dealing and a substantial nonexempt purpose).
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As I reflect on this symposium that took place in 2019 before the
origination of COVID-19 and the racial justice revolution ignited by the
killing of Mr. George Floyd in Minneapolis, I think about the great potential
of well-democratically-harnessed philanthropy and seriously doubt that can
be accomplished within the space of “private” philanthropy. I lean strongly
towards eliminating tax benefits for this private “philanthropy” by denying
tax exempt status to those organizations that are not public charities.
Why do I say this? Fundamentally, I believe the effort of philanthropy
should not be publicly supported if it is not collectively determined.30 To me,
Professor McCarden makes the beginnings of a persuasive case that the
values inculcated and supported through the private foundation system are
likely predominately exclusive ones rather than public ones. I think that lack
of a public nature should matter. Oddly, the private foundation tax
architecture not only supports these wealthy exclusive preferences, but as
Professor McCarden points out, it forces the private foundation to spend a lot
of money every year into the future furthering those preferences of the
wealthy. To be clear, the problem with this form of philanthropy is not that
it might support abstruse interests such as senators complained about with
respect to the Mellons, but that it works to provide significant and lasting
governmental benefits to the private, perhaps well meaning interests, of
people simply because they happen to be wealthy. The private foundation tax
architecture provides this support, lifts these efforts up, in the name of
supporting collective efforts, but they are far from collectively led.
I believe deeply in the power of a fiercely independent and courageous
civil society that empowers the voices of all in our communities, particularly
those voices that have been and continue to be disempowered. But, the
private foundation tax architecture even at its best likely can never really
support such a vision because it is defined privately. And, as Professor Aprill
shows, the lack of IRS enforcement capability likely makes this architecture
weak anyway and unlikely to be able to ever ensure such a democratically
based vision. The private foundation community is imbued with some
important social justice voices such as Darren Walker of the Ford

30
See Philip Hackney, Political Justice and Tax Policy: The Social Welfare Organization Case, 8
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (arguing that tax policy should prioritize political justice defined
to mean a democratic order rather than focus exclusively on equity as an economic matter and efficiency).
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Foundation31 and Elizabeth Alexander of the Mellon Foundation.32 Still, I
believe its predominate ethic is that of Carnegie from The Gospel of Wealth:
that the wealthy man is the savior of the rest of us, both in terms of their
ability to invest their dollars and to spend them in ways that improve all lives.
I think that wrong and harmful. That vision is not just antithetical to
democracy, but it is antithetical to racial, gender, sexual orientation, and
social justice. Given this, I think we ought to eliminate tax benefits for the
private foundation form.
But this is only one view. I have enormous admiration for the work
carried out by our philanthropic community. The voices included here do too
and each presents a different approach to the challenge taken on by Congress
fifty years ago. I expect we will still be struggling with this same challenge
fifty years from now. Please read on and consider the voices that follow.

31
Laura Hambleton, Catalyst Darren Walker, A Leader for Social Justice, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/blogs/impact/2019/11/13/catalyst-darren-walkerleader-social-justice/.
32
Len Gutkin, Elizabeth Alexander on the Mellon Foundation’s New Direction, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (July 6, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Elizabeth-Alexander-on-the/249120.
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